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power to destroy,"-' it is difficult to find any destructive effect in a
requirement that public officers shall pay the same taxes as other
citizens. Theoretically, of course, a legislature with unlimited taxing
powers might at some future time discriminate against public officers
by a higher tax rate than that imposed upon ordinary citizens; but
the fact that the power to tax the salaries of officers as income might
be abused does not justify a court in holding invalid a tax which does
not abuse this power. The possibility of discrimination against the
salaries of public officials would not even exist in Kentucky, where it
is well established that excises must be uniform, in the sense that
classification of taxpayers thereunder may not be arbitrary and un-
reasonable. -O Nor does it seem likely that such a tax will have the
effect of undermining the principle of separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary. "To require a man to pay the taxes
that all other men have to pay cannot possibly be made an instrument
to attack his independence as a judge."'
It would scarcely be argued that officers were protected by such
constitutional provisions from the necessity of paying property taxes,
sales taxes, and the like, though such taxes might be paid out of cur-
rent income derived solely from an official salary. An attempt might
be made to distinguish such a cqse from the case of an income tax
on the ground that such taxes are not levied upon the officer's salary,
though they may be paid therefrom. But the income tax itself affects
the officer's salary only in a similarly indirect manner; the tax is not
upon the salary, but upon net income, and the salary is not even the
measure of the tax, as is shown by the fact that two persons whose
sole sources of income were from salaries of equal size might pay
income taxes of different amounts, because of differences in their
exemptions."
On principle, therefore, it is submitted that the instant case is
correctly decided, though the numerical weight of authority is de-
cidedly against it. JOSEPH S. FREELAND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
VENUE STATUTES DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN RESIDENTS
AND NON-RESIDENTS.
Defendants, residents of Mississippi, while driving an automobile
through Kentucky, collided with and damaged a truck owned and
operated by plaintiff.; The accident occurred in Boyle County and plain-
tiff, a Jefferson County corporation, brought an action in that county
and service was made on defendants by serving a copy of the summons
."McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819).
"'See Trimble, Excise Taxes and the Uniformity 01azise of the Con-
stitution of Kentucky (1937), 25 Ky. L. J. 342, and cases cited therein.
"Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, Evans v. Gore, 253
U. S. 245, 265.
"Poorman v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, note 26.
:'Henry Fischer Packing Co. v. Mattox, 262 Ky. 318, 90 S. W. (2d)
70 (1936).
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on the secretary of state, under Sec. 12-1 of the Kentucky Statutes,
which provides that the use of the highways of the state by an non-
resident motorist is equivalent to appointment of the secretary of
state as his agent upon whom process may be served in actions arising
out of such use of the highways. Sec. 12-2 further provides:
"Said action may be filed either in the county where the loss
or damage may have occurred, or in the county where the plain-
tiff or one of the plaintiffs may reside ..."
Since the Kane and Hess$ cases it is well established that a state,
under its police power, may make the use of its highways a basis of
jurisdiction for personal actions arising out of such use, subject to the
condition imposed in the Wit chter' case, that the statute must provide
for the sending of notice to the non-resident. The Kentucky court, in
Hirsch v. Warren,6 upheld the statute as satisfying this condition,
declaring that the words "if any" in connection with the return registry
receipt were not fatal to its validity, since the defendant might refuse
to sign the receipt.
The main question presented by this case is whether Section 74
of the Kentucky Code, providing that in the case of resident defendants
in actions arising out of the operation of motor vehicles the action
may be brought either (a) in the county in which the accident
occurred, or (b) in the county in which the defendant resides and Sec-
tion 12-2 of the Kentucky Statutes, providing that in the case of non-
resident defendants, the action may be brought either (a) in the
county in which the accident occurred, or (b) in the county in which
the plaintiff resides, denies to the non-resident defendents the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
The Kentucky court, in holding the above statute unconstitutional,
based Its decision upon the result reached by the Supreme Court in
the case of Powers Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders.7 In that case de-
fendant, an Ohio corporation, maintained a local office at Stuttgart,
Arkansas, and plaintiff, also a resident of Ohio, was injured while
working at defendant's office in Stuttgart County, Arkansas. The
Arkansas statute requires actions for personal injuries received while
in the course of employment, if against a domestic corporation, to be
brought In any county in which it has its chief place of business, or
2Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
3 Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
'Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
' 253 Ky. 62, 68 S. W. (2d) 767 (1934).
6Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1936), Sec. 12-2: "... It shall then
be the duty of said secretary of state to write a letter to the defendant
in said petition at the address given in said petition, notifying said
defendant of the nature and pendency of said action, and to enclose
in said letter said summons and said copy of said petition. Said letter
shall be posted in the mails of the United States by prepaid registered
mail and bear the return address of said secretary. Said secretary
shall thereafter file, with the clerk issuing said process, a report of his
action, which shall include a copy of said letter and an answer thereto,
together with the return registry receipt, if any."
7274 U. S. 490 (1926).
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in which its chief officer resides, but if against a foreign corporation,
allows them to be brought in any county in the state. Plaintiff brought
the action in D County, Arknasas, and the court held the statute
unjustly discriminatory as to foreign corporations, denying them the
equal protection of the laws.
The Arkansas statute, which attempts to make a distinction be-
tween venue of actions as between domestic and foreign corporations,
while dealing, with a situation closely analogous to that of resident
and non-resident motorists, can, we think, be properly distinguished
from the Kentucky statute in two respects.
(1) The Arkansas statute gives the plaintiff an election of bringing
his action against a foreign corporation in any one of the seventy-five
counties in the state, while the Kentucky statute expressly limits the
action against non-resident motorists to one of two counties, i. e., the
county in which the accident occurred or the county In which the
plaintiff resides, both of which counties have some actual connection
with the action.
The defendant in the Powers Case, although a foreign corporation,
has a fixed place of business within the state, where it maintains an
office (in Stuttgart County) and where process may at any time, with-
out hardship upon the plaintiff, be served upon its agent. Its position
is not substantially different from that of a domestic corporation which
must be sued either in the county where the accident occurred, or
where it resides. Is there any convenience to be served by allowing
the plaintiff to summon the defendant to answer his complaint in any
one of the seventy-five counties of Arkansas when it could, at all times,
be reached in Stuttgart County? The non-resident motorist, having no
connection with any county, would not be inconvenienced in one more
than in another. It is well established that the pledge of equal pro-
tection of the laws does not prevent a state from adjusting its legis-
lation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that con-
nection. It does however, require that the classification be based on a
real or substantial difference, and in this situation, there is no
difference.8
(2) The Arkansas statute is concerned with persons having a
fixed place of business within the state, who are more or less perma-
nently located there and whose liability might conveniently be deter-
mined by the court of the county in which they have their place of
business, while the Kentucky statute attempts to regulate the use of
its highways by non-resident motorists. The state, in the latter
instance, is giving a fair choice to its residents, which choice cannot
be given to a non-resident.
What does the equal protection of the laws guaranty of the Fed.
eral Constitution mean? Does it mean a literal and precise equality?
In Jefferson (ounty Savings Banke v. Carland, et al.,O the plaintiff
bank, a corporation of Jefferson County, Alabama, brought an action
sFort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Employment, 274
U. S. 387 (1927).
"195 Ala. 279, 71 So. 126 (1916).
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on a contract made there against defendants (residents of Ohio) who
were served with process in C County, Alabama. The Code provides
that a resident shall have the right to have a change of venue to
the county in which he resides and has his personal effects, but makes
no similar provision as to a non-resident. The court held that in
the absence of a statutory provision the common law which allowed
transitory actions arising within the realm to be laid in any county,
would govern. Therefore, we have here not two statutes, as in the
prinelpal case, distinguishing between venue in actions against resi-
dents and non-residents, but precisely the same situation brought
about by a statute and the common law. The court held that there
was no denial to the non-resident defendants of the equal protection
of the laws, saying:
"The privilege which a resident of this state has, of being sued
In the county of his permanent residence, is personal to him. It is
conferred by our statute of venue, without which the place of trial
would be optional with the plaintiff. But the statute makes no
provision as to venue in transitory actions against non-residents.
By coming here, however transiently, defendants have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction which every state exercises over all
persons within its limits in respect to matters purely personal
which, in contemplation of law, have no locality; and we appre-
hend there Is no good reason why they should have the benefit of
a personal privilege of mere convenience which the state has
conferred only upon persons having permanent residence in this
state. Every substantial right they have may, and will, beyond
peradventure, be as fairly adjudicated and, for aught we can see,
as conveniently in Jefferson County as anywhere else In the state.
Due process and equal protection, which respectively, are satis-
fied by any practice having the sanction of common law usage,
and have reference to substance and not form, and do not require
that the privilege of localizing actions should be conferred alike
on resident and non-resident defendants, though in some states it
has been done."
This view is supported by dictum in the case of Cincinnati St. By.
Co. v. Snel,10 where the court said:
"It Is fundamental rights which the Fourteenth Amendment safe-
guards and not the mere forum which a state may see proper to
designate for the enforcement and protection of such rights. Given,
therefore, a condition where fundamental rights are equally pro-,
tected and preserved, it is impossible to say that the rights which
are thus protected and preserved have been denied because the
state has deemed best to provide for a trial in one forum or
another. It is not under any view the mere tribunal into which a
person Is authorized to proceed by a state which determines
whether the equal protection of the law has been afforded, but
whether in the tribunals which the state has provided equal laws
prevail."
This view is reiterated in Suncrest Lumber Co. v. N. C. Park
Comm.' and is an extension of Morrimac Veneer Co. v. Mcaalif,2 which
holds that a statute providing for a change of venue to a resident
096 Ohio St. 297, 117 N. E. 219 (1917).
30 Fed. (2d) 121 at 127 (1929).
'2129 Miss. 671, 92 So. 817 (1922).
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citizen who is sued out of the county of his household and residence,
and denying such change to a corporation, does not violate the equal
protection of the laws clause, as it does not affect any vital right, and
is a mere matter of practice for the convenience of natural persons
who are householders and residents of the county, for the state may
provide different rules as to venue between citizens and corporations
where it does not affect any material defense or liability.
A Wisconsin statute very similar to the one under consideration
provides that where a party against whom a judicial examination is
sought is a resident (individual or corporation), the examination must
be had in the county of his residence. If a non-resident individual,
it can be had in the state only if personal service was had upon
him and then only in the county in which served. If against a
non-resident corporation the examination may be had in any county
in the state, regardless of whether or not there is personal service.
That portion of the statute which distinguishes between non-resident
individuals and non-resident corporations was held to be discrimina-
tory in Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp.,12 but
the portion of the statute distinguishing between residents and non-
residents was not there considered. However, the distinction between
residents and non-residents is not so harsh as that between non-resi-
dent individuals and non-resident corporations and had it been con-
sidered, we believe the dissenting opinion, expressed by Mr. Justice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, to the effect that the equal protection
clause does not prevent a state from molding the details of its judicial
procedure to accord with the requirements of justice, would have been
applied.
Closely similar to the venue statutes are the non-resident motorist
statutes relating to service of process mentioned in the first part of
this note, which it is conceded at the present time do not deny the
equal protection of the laws to this class of persons. The mode of
service of process and giving notice, it is true, are different, but
when the final result is evaluated, it is apparent that there is no real
inequality of protection. Actually, the statutes operate to place resi-
dent and non-resident motorists on the same footing and if the differ-
ent problems presented in securing jurisdiction over resident and non-
resident motorists require a different form of procedure as to service
of process or venue, literal and precise equality is not demanded by
the Fourteenth Amendment.'4
The primary object of all these regulations as to venue and of
the Constitution with which they must comply, is to secure to parties
a fair and impartial trial of their causes and when this is accomplished,
fundamental justice has been attained. There is no denial of equal
protection of the laws merely because a state has seen fit to direct,
under particular conditions, a trial of a cause in one forum instead
1262 U. S. 544 (1922).
" 'Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
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of another, when in both forums equal laws are applicable and an
equal administration of justice is obtained.?5
The distinction In the Kentucky statutes relating to venue as
against non-residents and residents is, undoubtedly, a legitimate one,
which works no hardship upon the defendant. It is designed to secure
rights of the injured plaintiff which may otherwise be completely
lost, and the statute should be declared constitutional.
DOROTHY SALONi.
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN KENTUCKY
OTHER THAN FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT.
The Kentucky Code provides: "judgment shall be given for the
party whom the pleadings entitle thereto, though there may have
been a verdict against him".1 In view of this rather broad and
general statement, which would seem to include judgment on the
pleadings in any situation In which the pleadings are insufficient, the
paucity of cases in Kentucky relating to motion for judgment on the
pleadings is surprising. In other states this motion is not infrequently
used In practice under the reformed codes of procedure.2 Neverthe-
less, even in these states it Is not always looked upon with favor by
the courts."
The highest court of Kentucky has indulged in a great deal of
loose language In discussing judgments on the pleadings, so that it
Is difficult to ascertain by a reading of the cases whether the court
is speaking of judgment given on the pleadings on motion therefor,
or peremptory Instructions, demurrers, or judgments notwithstanding
the verdict. However, the propriety of this motion for judgment on
the pleadings would seem to be established by a few cases which,
upon careful perusal, appear to bear upon this point with some
degree of exactitude. The case of Mil er v. Hart4 squarely upholds
a judgment given on such a motion. In this case the defendant had
promised, for a consideration, to let the plaintiff have her life estate
in certain land, and relying on this promise the plaintiff had pur-
chased defendant's grandchildren's reversionary interest in the land.
The defendant then refused to abide by the agreement and the plain-
tiff brought suit. The defendant answered, denying the allegations
of the petition, and afterwards entered a motion for judgment in her
favor on the pleadings. Her position was that the contract was within
25 Iowa City Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389 (1895).
1 Kentucky Civil Code (Carroll, 1932), section 386.
2Finley v. Tucson, 7 Ariz. 108, 60 Pac. 872 (1900); Botto v.
Vandament, 67 Cal. 322, 7 Pac. 753 (1885); Steinhauer v. Colmar, 11
Colo. App. 494, 55 Pac. 291 (1898); Grimmett v. Grimmett, 80 Okla.
176, 195 Pac. 133 (1921); Robinson v. Anderson, 88 Okla. 136, 212 Pac.
121 (1922).
8Good v. First National Bank of Roff, 88 Okla. 110, 211 Pac. 1051
(1923); James River Nat. Bank v. Purchase, 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W. 7
(1900).
4122 Ky. 494, 91 S. W. 698 (1906).
